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1 
ABORTION RIGHTS IN THE SUPREME COURT: 
A TALE OF THREE WEDGES 
Jennifer S. Hendricks* 
In mid-May, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case designed 
to overrule Roe v. Wade.1 It’s safe to assume that six justices are inclined 
to repudiate Roe, and some of those six would like to go further, declaring 
a constitutional right to life that would prevent the abortion issue from 
going “back to the states” at all. One of the six, Chief Justice Roberts, is 
known to prefer stealth overruling of precedent, and he will likely 
convince at least one other member of the majority to overrule Roe 
carefully, with an eye toward the Court’s credibility and power. The 
question for the next year is not whether Roe will be overruled—it already 
was, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey2—but how far the Court will go. 
This essay describes the arc of the Supreme Court’s abortion 
jurisprudence in terms of three wedges—wedges that pry the pregnant 
woman apart from first, her fetus; second, her doctor; and third, her 
community. The first two wedges have each taken a turn as the primary 
rationale for restricting abortion rights. Roe itself founded abortion rights 
on the first wedge as a theory for restricting them: the concept of a state 
interest in the fetus itself, as an entity distinct from the pregnant woman. 
As public opinion shifted in support of women seeking abortions, Casey 
shifted to a new rationale for restrictions: distrust of the abortion provider, 
from whom the woman needed to be protected. Most recently, at least one 
justice has taken an interest in anti-abortion rhetoric that drives a wedge 
between the pregnant woman and her community by accusing Black 
women who have abortions of participating in eugenics and genocide. 
Professor Melissa Murray has argued that this last wedge may provide the 
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School
1. Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 945 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted in
part, No. 19-1392, (May 17, 2021). 
2. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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extra bit of force needed to plausibly overcome stare decisis and support 
the open overruling of Roe.3 
ONE 
woman / fetus 
The first wedge is the ultimate one when it comes to restrictions on 
abortion. It is the wedge between the woman and the fetus, based on the 
bio-medical concept of maternal–fetal conflict. The fundamental 
argument for restricting the right to abortion is the distinct and at times 
superior personhood of the fetus. 
In the beginning, in Roe v. Wade, two questions were presented, 
because constitutional analysis of fundamental rights always has two 
steps. The first question is whether there is a fundamental right to bodily 
integrity, to control of your own reproductive biology. That should have 
been an easy question. Of course that’s a fundamental right. There was 
clear precedent at the time about reproductive autonomy and about bodily 
integrity in general.4 It was only hard in Roe because, in that case, the 
question was whether women have that right independently of men. The 
more difficult, second question in Roe was when that right gives way to 
regulation. A woman might have all kinds of fundamental rights, but if 
the state has a compelling interest in restricting them, it can. That’s true 
for speech, privacy, religion, the right to bear arms—all our rights have 
boundaries. The real question in Roe was whether the state had a 
compelling interest that warranted restricting the woman’s rights over her 
body and reproduction. The answer that the Roe Court gave was yes, once 
the fetus is viable, the state can compel childbirth.5 
Why does this state interest justify such a significant intrusion on the 
woman’s body? The Roe Court cited two precedents for this invasion. 
First was Jacobson v. Massachusetts,6 which recognized the state’s power 
to require people to be vaccinated against smallpox. The need to protect 
others outweighed the minimal intrusion. The vaccine case, however, 
provided at best minimal support for state-compelled childbirth. The 
burden on the woman prevented from having an abortion is much greater 
3. Melissa Murray, Race-ing Roe: Reproductive Justice, Racial Justice, and the Battle for
Roe v. Wade, 134 HARV. L. REV. 2025 (2020); see also Melissa Murray, The Symbiosis of Abortion 
and Precedent, 134 HARV. L. REV. 308 (2020).  
4. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (adopting the “shocks the conscience test” and 
finding that forced stomach pumping violated a fundamental right); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 
535 (1942) (striking down forced sterilization as punishment for selected crimes). 
5. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1973). 
6. 197 U.S. 11 (1905), cited in Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. 
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than the burden on someone forced to take a vaccine. And the state’s 
interest in preventing the spread of contagious disease had a long and 
widely accepted history,7 unlike the interest in potential life that was 
newly formulated in Roe itself. The second precedent the Court leaned on 
in Roe was more to the point, because it dealt with the state’s power to 
regulate reproduction. For that principle, Roe cited Buck v. Bell.8 You may 
remember Buck v. Bell as the “three generations of imbeciles are enough” 
case. That was Justice Holmes’s comment about why the State of Virginia 
could forcibly sterilize Carrie Buck when it deemed her unfit to 
reproduce.9 The proof of Carrie Buck’s imbecility was a family history of 
reproducing out of wedlock. Buck herself was of perfectly sound mind, 
but she was the daughter of an unwed mother and had herself became an 
unwed mother at a young age.10 That, then, was the main precedent in Roe 
for the state’s power to restrict abortion. The same power that lets the state 
sterilize Carrie Buck because it didn’t want any potential lives that might 
come from her also allows the state to force other women to childbirth if 
it wants the potential lives in them. 
That state interest in potential life—which in Roe and Buck could 
support either the preservation or the prevention of potential life—has 
come to define abortion jurisprudence, as well as the political debate over 
when life begins. Even though Roe itself rejected the claim that the fetus 
was a “person” under the Fourteenth Amendment,11 it put the spotlight on 
the state’s interest on the fetus as its own entity, and that debate continues 
in many areas of law. State legislatures produce a steady stream of 
“personhood” bills that drag abortion politics into everything from 
infertility treatments to domestic violence against pregnant women to 
“child abuse” prosecutions of women who fall down stairs, attempt 
suicide, or get in car accidents.12 Now that we have a Supreme Court that 
is receptive to the principle of fetal personhood, states like Mississippi, 
which won the cert grant in Dobbs, are passing laws intended as direct 
challenges to Roe, banning abortion outright or from a very early point in 
pregnancy.13 There’s also starting to be more openness, occasionally in 
7. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 24–25. 
8. 274 U.S. 200 (1927), cited in Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. 
9. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207. 
10. See generally Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. 
Bell, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30 (1985). 
11. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158. 
12. See Mary Crossley, Reproducing Dignity: Race, Disability, and Reproductive Controls, 54 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195, 240–44 (2020). 
13. The Mississippi law at issue in Dobbs bans abortion after fifteen weeks since the woman’s 
last menstrual period. Other examples include six weeks in Georgia and eighteen weeks in Utah. 
4 CONLAWNOW [13:1 
bills themselves but certainly in public rhetoric, about the desire to 
criminalize and punish the woman herself, not only the doctor, for the 
abortion.14 
The rhetorical severing of the pregnant woman from her fetus is the 
consistent foundation for forcing women through pregnancy and birth. 
But there were a couple of decades when arguments along those lines were 
in retreat. Public opinion sympathized with women seeking abortions, so 
anti-abortion efforts needed a different target. They chose doctors. 
Proponents of anti-abortion laws cast women as the victims of abortion, 
themselves as women’s protectors. That’s the second wedge—the wedge 
between women and their doctors. 
TWO 
woman / doctor 
In 1992, most observers expected the Supreme Court to use Casey to 
overrule Roe. Instead, Casey reaffirmed Roe in theory while gutting it in 
practice. And it did two important things to drive in the first wedge and 
add a second. First, Casey consolidated the ideology of the first wedge by 
authorizing an extremely narrow life and health exception. Under Casey, 
after viability (and even before, when it comes to any other regulations), 
a woman is entitled to survive her pregnancy with most of her organs 
intact, but not much more than that.15 Second, and most famously, Casey 
lowered the standard for restrictions on abortion from “strict scrutiny” to 
“undue burden.” The undue burden standard is supposed to mean that the 
state cannot restrict abortion with laws that have “the purpose or effect of 
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an 
abortion.”16 That is most of what we’ve been litigating about ever since 
Casey—which burdens are undue in this sense? 
There are two main types of burdens that states like to enact. The 
first are called TRAPs, which stands for “targeted regulation of abortion 
provider.” These are nitpicky rules that a state legislature passes to make 
SisterSong Women of Color Reproductive Justice Collective v. Kemp, 472 F.Supp.3d 1297 (N.D. Ga. 
2020) (striking down the Georgia ban); Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Utah v. Miner, No. 2:19-CV-
00238 (D. Utah) (pending challenge to the Utah ban). 
14. E.g., Tom Kertscher, In Context: Transcript of Donald Trump on Punishing Women for 
Abortion, POLITIFACT (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.politifact.com/article/2016/mar/30/context-
transcript-donald-trump-punishing-women-ab/ 
15. Casey, 505 U.S. at 880; cf. Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: An Historical
Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 365 
(1992) (describing similar laws as protecting merely “brute physical survival”). 
16. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. 
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it more difficult and expensive to run an abortion clinic. It is one of the 
main ways that access to abortion has been decimated since Casey was 
decided, a sort of death-by-a-thousand-cuts harassment of abortion 
clinics. The federal courts have pretty much rolled over to this kind of 
regulation. Doctrinally, they do so by focusing almost entirely on 
speculation about whether a particular restriction really has a “substantial” 
enough “effect” on women being able to get abortions, and completely 
ignoring the “purpose” part of the test.17 The purpose of a TRAP is 
transparent and obvious, but courts have insisted on simply taking the 
word of the state’s lawyer, who shows up in court and says, “We’re just 
trying to protect women.” Courts accept that rather than look at any actual 
evidence about the purpose of the law.18 So the litigation since Casey has 
been mired in semantics over what’s “substantial,” and the right to 
abortion has withered on the vine. 
One interesting thing about TRAPs, of course, is that they target the 
right to abortion indirectly, by targeting the provider rather than the 
woman’s actual decision to have an abortion. But that’s also what makes 
this a wedge. TRAPs set up the abortion provider as the suspect character 
in need of regulation, so the state becomes the woman’s protector, 
protecting her from her doctor. This is a real shift from Roe. Roe is well 
known for its valorization of the doctor who is deciding whether to 
perform an abortion. If you go back and read Roe, you may be surprised 
by how much it reads as a doctor’s rights opinion not a women’s rights 
opinion.19 Casey reads much more like a women’s rights decision.20 (It’s 
not a coincidence that the decision that made abortion a question of 
women’s rights rather than doctors rights is also the decision in which that 
right was dramatically weakened.) By the time of Casey, we had justices, 
particularly Justice Kennedy, who looked at the doctor and saw not a 
17. See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Undue Burdens in Texas, 127 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 145 
(2014). 
18. Cf.  Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. _, 138 S.Ct. 2392(2018) (ignoring the president’s political 
promise to impose a “Muslim ban” on immigration and accepting the government’s rationale offered 
in litigation). In 2016, the Supreme Court added a cost-benefit gloss to the undue burden test, 
suggesting that courts should at least weigh the purported, beneficial purpose of the law against the 
burdens imposed on women, although it stopped short of holding that an improper purpose would 
result in the law being struck down. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. _, 136 S.Ct. 
2292 (2016). 
19. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (“[F]or the period of pregnancy prior to this ‘compelling’ 
point, the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation 
by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient’s pregnancy should be terminated.”). 
20. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 895–98 (striking down a husband-notification requirement because 
the state “may not give to a man the kind of dominion over his wife that parents exercise over their 
children”). 
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respected professional but an “abortionist”21 who couldn’t be trusted. In 
essence, the price of “saving” Roe in Casey was that someone would 
replace the doctor as the paternalistic overseer of the woman’s decision, 
and that someone was the state. 
This new adversariness between the woman and the doctor becomes 
even more explicit in another kind of regulation, where the state interferes 
directly with the decision-making process about whether to have an 
abortion at all. Sometimes the state interferes by giving some third party 
the right to participate—as with parental consent laws (which have mostly 
been upheld, as long as there’s judicial bypass) or husband/biological 
father consent laws (which so far have been struck down).22 But the state 
also inserts itself into the decision through what it calls informed consent. 
In their most extreme forms, these are the laws which force women to 
have medically unnecessary ultrasounds and listen to anti-abortion 
propaganda before they are allowed to have an abortion—usually with a 
waiting period thrown in to make it more difficult. In these situations, it 
is clear that what the state is “protecting” the woman from is the abortion 
itself. The state is not regulating the safety of a medical facility or 
protecting the woman’s autonomy through informed consent. It is trying 
to dissuade her from having an abortion because the abortion will be bad 
for her and she will eventually regret it.23 
All of these supposedly woman-protective arguments for abortion set 
up the abortion provider as the enemy, the person from whom the woman 
needs to be protected. That characterization is coming to its fruition in an 
argument that a few members of the Supreme Court have started to 
encourage parties to serve up, which is that abortion providers lack 
standing to challenge abortion restrictions because they have a “blatant 
conflict of interest” with their patients.24 The doctors and clinics, on this 
view, are just raking in money from abortions, preying on women in the 
process. In any other context, this argument against standing would be 
rightfully dismissed out of hand. It’s well established that the business 
providing a service can assert the rights of the customer seeking the 
21. Justice Kennedy’s dissent in the first “partial-birth abortion” case, Stenberg v. Carhart, 
530 U.S. 914 (2000), used the word abortionist thirteen times. 
22. Casey, 505 U.S. at 899 (parental consent), 895–98 (spousal notification). 
23. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (expressly permitting regulations that “create a structural
mechanism by which the State . . .  may express profound respect for the life of the unborn”); see also 
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (justifying restrictions on abortions on the grounds 
that women might regret having them). 
24. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 591 U.S. _, 140 S.Ct. 2013, 2153 (2020) (Alito, J.,
dissenting). 
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service,25 and making an exception to that for abortion is absurd—unless 
you see the woman’s decision to have an abortion as inherently suspect 
and wrong and therefore the abortion provider as a sort of evil, coercive 
figure. Which is how a majority of the Supreme Court now sees it. 
If this argument succeeds, it will be a body blow to the usual 
litigation strategy for protecting abortion rights. A glance through the 
names of the important abortion cases in the Supreme Court over the last 
50 years reveals that the vast majority have been brought by abortion 
providers—mostly Planned Parenthood—only occasionally by individual 
women; Roe itself was exceptional in that way. I confess, I see a silver 
lining when it comes to this wedge. Even as the rhetoric around abortion 
shifted from doctors’ rights to women’s rights, the doctors took over the 
litigation program, which in my view has done real harm to the side. For 
example, the issue of “partial-birth abortion” was litigated as a fight 
between Justices Breyer and Kennedy over whether the doctor or the 
legislature, respectively, should decide what kind of abortion a woman 
should have.26 The loss of third-party standing would require a strategic 
overhaul, and perhaps control over abortion litigation would shift a bit 
away from medical providers and back toward feminist activists. The 
standing issue may, however, be moot if a majority of the Court believes 
it is politically feasible to repudiate Roe entirely next year. 
THREE 
woman / community 
That brings us to the third wedge, between the woman and her 
community. As Professor Murray has powerfully demonstrated, this looks 
like the wedge of the future.27 It starts with trait-selection laws. These are 
laws that prohibit abortion for particular reasons. The first and most 
common ones are prohibitions on abortion for the purpose of sex selection 
or because of a genetic anomaly in the fetus. We know people have 
abortions for these reasons—probably very few for sex-selection, but 
more for genetic anomalies, which are widely considered a legitimate 
reason for abortion, among those in the habit of passing judgment. 
25. See Elika Nassirinia, Third-Party Standing and Abortion Providers: The Hidden Dangers
of June Medical Services, 16 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 214 (2021). 
26. Jennifer S. Hendricks, Body and Soul: Equality, Pregnancy, and the Unitary Right to
Abortion, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329, 370 (2010) (“Not until Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in 
Carhart II was there any suggestion that the pregnant woman might be an appropriate decision-
maker.”). 
27. Murray, supra note 3, at 2040–41. 
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Trait-selection laws represent a step away from the idea of the 
woman as the victim of abortion and move her back into the perpetrator 
role. With these laws, it’s actually the doctor who is supposed to be the 
front-line enforcer, refusing to perform the abortion if the woman’s reason 
is illegitimate. Trait-selection laws also incorporate a kind of personhood 
argument. They cast the fetus as the person it could become and make an 
implicit argument about discrimination against that sort of potential future 
person. Thus, part of the power of trait-selection laws is that they appeal 
to left/liberal concerns about social justice, sex and disability 
discrimination, and how those relate to abortion. They invite observers to 
make the critical error of conflating two questions: (1) what do I think are 
good reasons for having an abortion? and (2) when should the state force 
women through pregnancy and childbirth? 
Recently, the Supreme Court’s attention was briefly turned to a trait-
selection law that adds one more prohibited basis for abortion. In addition 
to sex and disability, laws in a few states prohibit abortion because of the 
fetus’s race. One of those states was Indiana. Its trait-selection law was 
struck down by the Seventh Circuit, and the Supreme Court ultimately 
denied review, but Justice Thomas wrote a concurrence highlighting the 
question of race-selection in abortion as one the Court must soon face.28 
We’re used to hearing traits like race, sex, and disability grouped 
together in discrimination law, but pause and notice what is odd in this 
context. What is the scenario that the Indiana legislature is imagining, in 
which a woman considers race as a factor in deciding to have an abortion? 
One might imagine a scenario in which a White woman decides to abort 
because she got pregnant with a Black man. For example, a White lesbian 
couple recently sued a fertility clinic for giving them the wrong sperm. 
Specifically, they had selected a White sperm donor but were given sperm 
from a Black donor. Most of their claimed damages flowed from the racial 
aspect of the error—that they and their daughter would now have to 
contend with racism in their lives—rather than any of the other 
characteristics for which they may have selected one donor over another.29 
One could imagine that, if the error had been discovered early, the woman 
who was pregnant might have decided to have an abortion and try again. 
Under Indiana’s trait-selection law, that abortion would presumably have 
been illegal. 
28. Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. and Ky., Inc., 587 U.S. _, 139 S.Ct. 1780, 1782 (2019). 
29. Cramblett v. Midwest Sperm Bank, LLC, No. 2014-L-010159 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Sept. 29, 2014), 
2014 WL 4853400. See generally Camille Gear Rich, Contracting Our Way to Inequality: Race, 
Reproductive Freedom and the Quest for the Perfect Child, 104 MINN. L. REV. 2375 (2020). 
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This unusual case, however, is not what trait-selection laws are 
about. Including race in trait-selection laws is a way of invoking a 
narrative that abortion is a kind of eugenics—specifically, that abortion is 
“Black genocide.” What that means is that these laws are aimed at Black 
women—not in a very practical way, but the point is to accuse Black 
women of participating in eugenics and genocide against the Black 
community for having abortions. This narrative has been around for a long 
time. As Professor Murray elucidates, it has a history in the anti-abortion 
movement but also in the more male-oriented civil rights groups, with, for 
example, some Black Panthers embracing the argument that White 
society, by allowing Black women to have abortions, was targeting and 
trying to eliminate the Black community.30 This is an argument that 
Justice Thomas has invited states to make in the future as a justification 
for overturning Roe and banning abortion. 
This argument picks up on and co-opts arguments from the feminist 
left, in this case from the reproductive justice movement. “Reproductive 
justice” is a concept that includes reproductive rights as lawyers 
traditionally think of them in law but also a much broader struggle against 
reproductive oppression.31 It comes out of the experience and activism of 
Black women, who among many other concerns have argued that the 
large, White-dominated feminist organizations put too much emphasis on 
abortion and contraception and not enough on other forms of reproductive 
oppression—forced sterilization, environmental racism that leads to 
infertility, poverty and state-sponsored violence that interfere with being 
able to raise children with dignity, and family separation policies aimed 
at children of color. All of those aspects of reproductive justice, and 
reproductive oppression, contribute to why Black women 
disproportionately have abortions, and there is no question that the 
movements for contraception and abortion rights were racist; indeed, the 
head of Planned Parenthood recently published an opinion piece in the 
New York Times titled, “We’re Done Making Excuses for Our Founder.”32 
But what Justice Thomas and others who put this argument forward do is 
put the blame not on Margaret Sanger and her ilk but on the Black woman 
seeking the abortion, the woman who is coping with all of that oppression 
30. Murray, supra note 3, at 2041–45. 
31. See generally Zakiya Luna & Kristin Luker, Reproductive Justice, 9 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. 
SCI. 327 (2014); Dorothy Roberts, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE 
MEANING OF LIBERTY 308–12 (2d ed. 2017) (setting out an agenda for incorporating reproductive 
justice priorities into the legal system’s understanding of reproductive liberty). 
32. Alexis McGill Johnson, I’m the Head of Planned Parenthood. We’re Done Making
Excuses for Our Founder, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/17/
opinion/planned-parenthood-margaret-sanger.html. 
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and making the best decision that she can see for herself and her family. 
They’re blaming her and calling her the eugenicist. 
Where is that argument going? It doesn’t really have much to do with 
trait-selection laws. Rather, as Professor Murray powerfully warns, it is a 
frontal attack of Roe as irretrievably tainted by eugenics, so that it can be 
overruled as the product of a racist program, a modern-day Dred Scott.33 
And be clear. The end-game here is not just to overrule Roe in the sense 
many people continue to naively assume, where abortion gets “sent back 
to the states.” Abortion has already been sent back to the states; Casey and 
the undue burden test did that. The trajectory of this argument is not just 
to overrule Roe but to establish a right to life for the fetus, superior to the 
rights of the pregnant woman, not through a constitutional amendment but 
through a Supreme Court decision, so that the Supreme Court would rule 
not just that abortion is unprotected but that it is, in fact, constitutionally 
prohibited everywhere in the U.S.34 
Conclusion 
Justice Breyer should announce his retirement immediately.35 
33. Murray, supra note 3, at 2071–88. 
34. The easiest path for preventing states from allowing abortion would be for the Supreme
Court to declare that fetuses are “persons” and that it is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause for 
states to exclude abortion from criminal homicide laws. See, e.g., Charles I. Lugosi, Conforming to 
the Rule of Law: When Person and Human Being Finally Mean the Same Thing in Fourteenth 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 4 GEO. J.L. & POL’Y 361, 364–65 (2006) (“The Fourteenth Amendment 
would thereafter prohibit abortion in every state.”). 
35. See Paul F. Campos, Justice Breyer Should Retire Right Now, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/15/opinion/stephen-breyer-supreme-court.html (“At the moment, 
no fewer than six Democratic senators over the age of 70 represent states where a Republican 
governor would be free to replace them with a Republican, should a vacancy occur.”) 
